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1 See DeLong and Summers
(1992) and Summers (1991).
Marty and Thornton (1995)
provide an analysis of several
arguments asserting that the
economy beneﬁts from
moderate inﬂation.
2 See Howitt (1990).
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he central banks of New Zealand,
Canada, and the United Kingdom have
recently decided to make price stability
the overriding goal of monetary policy.
Similar proposals in the United States 
have received a lukewarm reception.
Although some opponents have argued
that moderate inﬂation is beneﬁcial, many
concede its effect on economic welfare 
is detrimental.1 Instead, they argue that 
a price stability policy is suboptimal
because, once inﬂation is under way, it 
is better to tolerate some moderate inﬂa-
tion than to bear the cost necessary to
achieve price stability.  Howitt’s Rule is 
the clearest statement of the proposition
that the beneﬁts resulting from reducing
inﬂation must be weighed against the cost
of reducing it.2 (See the shaded insert,
“Howitt’s Rule.”)
Assuming inﬂation affects both the
level and growth rate of output, I state
Howitt’s Rule and explain how it argues for
a continued policy of moderate inﬂation.
Next, I analyze alternative estimates of the
costs of achieving price stability and com-
pare these costs with estimates of the gain
from achieving price stability when inﬂa-
tion reduces the level or growth rate of
output.  Finally, I brieﬂy review the cross-
section and time-series evidence on the
effects of inﬂation on output growth.  In





Howitt (1990) argues that, although
inﬂation is costly, once it is under way,
society is better off to tolerate a little inﬂa-
tion than to bear the cost necessary to
achieve price stability.  Howitt (1990, 
p. 103 ) notes, “There are a host of reasons
why the best average rate of inﬂation,
ignoring costs of getting there, is zero . . .”
(italics added).  Arguing that the cost 
of achieving zero inﬂation may be sub-
stantial, however, Howitt suggests his rule
can be used to determine the “optimal”
inﬂation rate.
Howitt argues that the transitions cost
“will not be negligible, so that it will be
optimal to stop disinﬂation, even when 
the gain from further reduction is still pos-
itive.”  Therefore, Howitt (1990, p. 104)
concludes, “The optimal target is probably
somewhere above zero” (italics added).
The cost-beneﬁt trade-off Howitt
alludes to is represented in Figure 1
(under the assumption that inﬂation
reduces the level of output).  At time t0
policymakers decide to pursue a policy
that will reduce the steady-state inﬂation
rate from its current level to a lower level,
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HOWITT’S RULE
In order to estimate the optimal target rate of
inﬂation, one must somehow balance the gains from
reducing inﬂation against the costs of doing so. The
reduction in inﬂation should continue as long as the
present discounted value of the beneﬁts to society 
from a further small reduction exceeds the present
discounted value of the cost.  The optimal target rate 
is the rate at which the beneﬁt of further reduction just
equals the cost of raising unemployment by the required
amount above the natural rate.  (Howitt, 1990, p. 104,
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3 In Figure 1, once output has
returned to its previous trend
level, the time it takes to get 
to the new higher level is so
short that it is inconsequential.
If this is not the case, the
estimates of the gains from
reducing inﬂation (presented
later) are overstated.  More-
over, if the period to achieve
the higher level of output is
very long, it will be extremely
difﬁcult empirically to differen-
tiate between level and growth
rate effects of inﬂation because
output would grow at a rate
above its trend level for a long
period before reaching its
permanently higher level.
4 See Barro (1995 and forth-
coming); Bruno (1995); Clark
(1993); Ericsson, Irons, and
Tryon (1993); Fischer (1993);
Dotsey and Ireland (1993);
Briault (1995); Grier and
Tullock (1989); Kormendi and
Meguire (1985); Levine and
Renelt (1991 and 1992);
Logue and Sweeney (1981);
Orphanides and Solow (1990);
Ireland (1995); Jones and
Manuelli (1995); Chari, Jones,
and Manuelli (1995); King and
Rebelo (1990); Golob (1993).
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perhaps zero.  This change in policy 
causes output to fall below its steady-state 
path until time t1, when the economy
achieves its new lower inﬂation rate and 
a permanently higher level of output.3
The permanent increase in the level of
output is taken to be some proportion, 
q, of current period output, that is, the
increase is equal to qy0.  The shaded area
marked G represents the permanent gain
to output associated with achieving a
lower rate of inﬂation for a given time
horizon (T).  The shaded area marked L
denotes the temporary output loss associ-
ated with reducing the steady-state
inﬂation rate.
Discounting Future Output
Howitt’s Rule states that disinﬂation
should continue until the present value 
of G equals the present value of L.  Hence,
the output levels in Figure 1 must be
discounted at some discount rate, b.
Figure 1 can be easily modiﬁed to show
the effect of discounting.  This is done in
Figure 2, which shows the present (time
t0) value of the output streams in Figure 1
discounted at the rate b.  Figure 2 assumes
that the discount rate is larger than the
growth rate of output, a, so the present
value of future output always lies below
current output.
Under this assumption, the present
value of future output approaches zero 
as the time horizon approaches inﬁnity, 
T ® ¥.  This is true for both the high- and
low-inﬂation output paths.  Consequently,
the present value of the gain from reducing
inﬂation, pvg in Figure 2 (the shaded area
between the present values of these altern a-
t i v e output paths), is ﬁnite.  Howitt’s Rule
is to cease the disinﬂation process when
pvg equals pvl.  Hence, it is possible to
choose a positive inﬂation rate as the
“optimal target inﬂation rate.”
The sizes of pvg and pvl depend on 
the level of current output, y0, so it is
convenient to express the present value 
of the gain and present value of the loss
from reducing inﬂation as a proportion 





When Inﬂation Affects 
Output Growth
Figures 1 and 2 are drawn under 
the assumption that inﬂation affects 
only the level of output.  Increasingly,
economists have paid attention to the
possibility that inﬂation may affect the
growth rate of output.4
The behavior of output associated
with reducing the steady-state inﬂation
rate when inﬂation reduces output growth
is shown in Figure 3, as well as the output
paths for the high- and low-inﬂation alter-
natives and the present values of these
paths.  It is assumed that inﬂation reduces
output growth, that is, the growth rate 
of output in the low-inﬂation state, µ, is
larger than the growth rate of output in 
the high-inﬂation state, a.  Figure 3 is
drawn under the assumption that the rate
at which future output is discounted is
greater than the low-inﬂation output
growth rate, b > µ.  In this case, the
present value of future output approaches
zero as T ® ¥ for both the low- and high-
inﬂation states.  Consequently, PVG is
ﬁnite for any value of T.
Figure 1
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5 See Phelps (1979), Taylor
(1983), Aiyagari (1990), 
and Ball (1994b).  Aiyagari
(1990, p. 2) discusses why
real output is an appropriate
measure of welfare for govern-
mental policy analyses.
6 For example, during times of
war, output typically increases;
however, most people would
consider themselves to be
worse off.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF
HOWITT’S RULE
A number of conditions must be
fulﬁlled to apply Howitt’s Rule.  Some, 
like determining the relative sizes of PVG
and PVL, are obvious.  Others are subtle,
yet just as important.  I begin my assess-
ment of Howitt’s Rule with a discussion 
of the less obvious conditions upon which
it depends.
Output as the Appropriate Measure
of the Beneﬁts and Costs
In Figures 1, 2, and 3, I implicitly
assumed that the costs and beneﬁts could
adequately be represented by output gains
and losses.  This practice is common in
much theoretical and virtually all applied
work.5 Two important limitations on this
practice should be noted, however.  One is
that measured output does not conform
perfectly with the theoretical measures.
For example, measured output does not
include home production.  Hence, applica-
tions of Howitt’s Rule to real-world data
are problematic.  This is a problem for
virtually all applied work, so I do not
discuss it further.
A more important limitation is that
output is an imperfect measure of economic
w e l f a re.  In economics, welfare is measure d
more abstractly, but more correctly, by the
concept of utility.  If there were a one-to-one
c o rrespondence between output and utility,
there would be no problem, but this is 
not the case.
In theory or in practice, output does
not include the utility individuals obtain
from leisure.  When more time is spent in
p roduction, less time is available for leisure .
Consequently, it is possible for output to
increase while economic welfare declines.6
This consideration is particularly import a n t
for assessing the costs of inﬂation (and, con-
s e q u e n t l y, the beneﬁts from disinﬂation)
because inﬂation is believed to distort the
allocation of re s o u rces, in part i c u l a r, the dis-
tribution of time between work and leisure .
The precise rationale for inﬂation’s dis-
torting effect varies from model to model.
Many economists, however, believe that
money is held to facilitate trade.  Money 
is costly to hold, with the annual marginal
cost per real dollar held equal to the nom-
inal interest rate.  The nominal interest
rate is equal to the real interest rate (deter-
mined by real factors, such as productivity
and thrift) and the expected rate of inﬂa t i o n .
In the long run, actual and expected
interest rates should be equal, regardless 
of how expectations are formed.  Inﬂation
is costly because the nominal interest rate
becomes higher as the steady-state inﬂa t i o n
rate rises.  Consequently, so too is the 
cost of holding money.  Indeed, the nominal
Figure 2
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7 To argue that welfare is some-
how higher is to argue that
i n ﬂation is beneﬁcial.  See Mart y
and Thornton (1995) for an
analysis of four arguments that
moderate inﬂation is beneﬁcial.
8 Although it is possible that
Howitt’s Rule would choose a
negative rate of inﬂation in this
case, I will not consider it here.
Friedman (1969) suggested
that the optimal monetary
policy was to set the inﬂation
rate to the negative of the real
interest rate, so that the nomi-
nal interest rate would be zero.
Consistent with the above
analysis, a zero nominal
interest rate would induce indi-
viduals to hold the maximum
amount of real money balances
(since the nominal interest rate
cannot be negative) and, hence,
derive the maximum beneﬁt
from holding money.  Fried-
m a n ’s analysis assumes, among
other things, a zero cost of main-
taining the real money stock.
9 If the time horizon is inﬁnite,
for such problems to have a
solution, utility must be
discounted at a positive rate.
For example, in the case of
continuous time, this is necessi-
tated by the fact that the objec-




F(t, y, dy/dt)dt. If this
objective functional is not ﬁnite,
there may be several paths that
have inﬁnite values.  Although
there are methods for isolating
the optimal path in cases
where the objective functional
does not converge, these
methods are difﬁcult to apply.
Therefore, it is common to
express the objective functional




Discounting is necessary, but
not sufﬁcient to guarantee the
convergence of this improper
integral, however.  Discounting
is sufﬁcient only if the function
that is being discounted is
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interest rate increases approximately point
for point with the steady-state inﬂation rate.
The higher the nominal interest rate,
the fewer real money balances individuals
wish to hold.  In an attempt to hold less
m o n e y, individuals reallocate their re s o u rc e s .
The result may be reduced output, less
leisure time, or both.  Regardless of the
outcome, economic welfare is reduced.
For example, if individuals have less time
for leisure, but output is unchanged, welfare
falls.  Consequently, associating the costs
of inﬂation with output tends to bias
Howitt’s Rule toward a higher inﬂation rate
than would be optimal if the welfare costs
were correctly identiﬁed and measured.
M o re generally, unless inﬂation is somehow
beneﬁcial, welfare must be lower at the
higher inﬂation rate—even if the measured
level of output is unchanged.7 Hence, when
output is the measure of welfare, an inﬂa-
tion bias is imparted to Howitt’s Rule.
Discounting Output or Utility
Howitt’s Rule calls for discounting the
cost and beneﬁt at a positive discount rate.
Discounting is critical to Howitt’s Rule.
The reason is simple:  Without discounting,
Howitt’s Rule would always choose zero as
the optimal inﬂation target.  The cost of
reducing inﬂation (the area re p resented by
L in Figure 1) is ﬁnite.  This is true whether
or not the cost of reducing inﬂation is 
discounted.  In contrast, the b e n e ﬁt fro m
reducing inﬂation is ﬁnite only if it is
discounted.  (Altern a t i v e l y, the time horizon,
T, is ﬁnite. I say more about this later.)
C o n s e q u e n t l y, without discounting, Howitt’s
Rule will always choose zero inﬂation no
matter how small the effect of inﬂation on
either the level or growth rate of output.8
Discounting future income streams 
is such an integral part of ﬁnancial decision
making that the need to discount future
income is taken for granted.  Discounting
utility is fundamentally different, however.
It is important to distinguish it from
discounting commonly used in ﬁnance.  
Frequently, individuals are assumed 
to maximize the expected value of their
lifetime utility from consumption and
leisure, given their expected lifetime earn-
ings (or resource endowments).9 The
discount rate has a speciﬁc interpretation in
such analyses. The greater an individual’s
preference for current consumption (rela-
tive to future consumption), the larger the
rate at which future income is discounted.
Individuals who are impatient to consume
have higher discount rates; those who are
less anxious to consume have lower discount
rates.10 Consequently, the discount rate
can be interpreted as an individual’s rate 
of time preference.
Although it may be reasonable to
assume that individuals discount their
expected future utility relative to their
current utility in making optimal plans,
the role of discounting in evaluating
transfers between individuals or between
generations is controversial.  Indeed, the
mathematical economist Frank P. Ramsey
(1928) considered it “ethically indefen-
sible” for the current generation to discount
the utility of future generations.  At issue
is whether it is appropriate for the current
generation to assert that the welfare of future
generations is less important than its own
when making policy decisions that will aff e c t
the welfare of future generations forever.
Despite Ramsey’s moral indignation,
the practice of discounting utility or output
is commonplace in theoretical, as well as
practical, intergenerational public policy
analyses.  Perhaps intergenerational
discounting is nonchalantly invoked
because it appears to be consistent with
human behavior.11 Nevertheless, it is
important to note that if you believe, as
some economists do, that intergenerat i o n a l
discounting is morally re p re h e n s i b l e , you
must conclude that the optimal inﬂation
policy is price stability.  If interg e n e r a t i o n a l
discounting is inappropriate, so too is
Howitt’s Rule.  In this event, the only basis
for favoring a policy of moderate inﬂation
is to argue that moderate inﬂation actually
enhances economic welfare.
The Discount Rate
Discounting utility or output is neces-
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from reducing inﬂation to be ﬁnite.  The
discount rate must also be larger than 
the growth rate of output under stable
prices.12 If b is not larger than µ, the
present value of the beneﬁt of reducing
inﬂation increases without bound as 
T ® ¥.  Hence, Howitt’s Rule will always
choose zero as the optimal inﬂation rate
regardless of the cost of getting there.
Given the critical nature of this
requirement, it is natural to ask, Is it
reasonable to assume that b is larger than
µ?  Unfortunately, there is no deﬁnitive
answer.  Nothing in economic theory
ensures that this condition will hold.
Likewise, nothing prevents it from holding.
In simple models of intertemporal utility
maximization, optimization requires that
the rate of time preference equal the real
interest rate.  Theoretical models of this
sort are usually solved by imposing a
strong form of rational expectations called
certainty equivalence.  For this reason, the
rate on very long-term, default-risk-free
Treasury securities averaged over a long
period is frequently taken as a proxy for
the rate of time preference.
The ex post real rates on 10-year and
30-year Treasury bonds over the period 
of available data are presented in Table 1,
along with the growth rates of real gross
domestic product (GDP) for the same
periods.  These ﬁgures are generally
consistent with the assumption that the
rate of time preference exceeds the growth
rate of output.  In the case of the 10-year
bond rate for the period 1954-94, however,
the reverse is true.  Moreover, the differ-
ence by which the long-term Treasury
bond rate exceeds the growth rate of
output is, at most, approximately 1.3 per-
centage points.
Hurd’s (1989) attempts at estimating
the rate of time preference directly have
generally produced much smaller estimates
of the rate of time preference.  Although
H u rd ’s estimates vary with the speciﬁc a t i o n
of the model and the estimation technique,
they are generally too small to justify the
assumption that b > µ.  Without this con-
dition, however, Howitt’s Rule will always
choose price stability as being optimal.
The Time Horizon
We have implicitly assumed that the
time horizon, T, is inﬁnite.  But since it is
possible to make the output gain from dis-
inﬂation ﬁnite simply by assuming that 
T is ﬁnite, this possibility should be
considered.  The analysis of the discount
rate applies equally well to the choice of
time horizon.  The assumption that the
time horizon is ﬁnite is tantamount to
stating that, beyond some point, all output
or utility is discounted to zero.  Hence,
choosing a ﬁnite time horizon is analogous
to imposing an arbitrarily high discount
rate on all gains beyond some point.  It is
just as difﬁcult to rationalize a ﬁnite time
horizon as it is to rationalize an inﬁnitely
high discount rate.  Consequently, if you
believe the time horizon should be ﬁnite,
you might just as well argue that the
discount rate should be large.
APPLYING HOWITT’S RULE
If the conditions needed to yield a
nonzero optimal inﬂation target when
applying Howitt’s Rule are accepted, it is
still necessary to calculate the loss associ-
ated with the disinﬂation policy and the
gain associated with achieving the lower
inﬂation rate.  Neither task is easy.
The Costs of Disinﬂation Policy
The costs of disinﬂation policy 
are associated with the stickiness of 
prices and wages.13 In models where
prices and wages are completely ﬂexible, 
it is difﬁcult for disinﬂationary mone-
bounded, that is, has a ﬁnite
limit.  If the function is not
bounded, the objective
functional will only converge 
if the discount rate is sufﬁ-
ciently large.
10Thus, some economists argue
that relative savings rates are
evidence of relative rates of
time preference.  Individuals 
or countries with high savings
rates have low rates of time
preference and vice versa.
11If concern for future genera-
tions is a strong motivation, we
should expect to ﬁnd a strong
bequest motive in individuals’
consumption and saving
behavior.  Hurd (1989) ﬁnds
desired bequests to be all but
nonexistent, however.  He
concludes, “apparently most
bequests are accidental, the
result of uncertainty about the
date of death.”
12There is also a question of
whether output should be put
on a per capita basis.  Most
theoretical work is done in per
capita terms.  Most applied
work in this area has been
done using aggregate output.
Since there is no compelling
reason to prefer one over the
other, the practical convention
is followed here, except where
explicitly noted.
13See, for example, Aiyagari
(1990).
MA R C H/ A P R I L 1 9 9 6
Real Long-Te rm Tr e a s u ry Bond Rates and
Real GDP Growth Rates
Period 10-Year Rate 30-Year Rate GDP
1954-94 2.66 NA1 2.88
1978-94 3.74 3.84 2.48
1 Data not available.
Table 1tary policy to have adverse short-run
output effects.  Even with sticky prices,
however, there is general agreement that, 
if the monetary authority’s disinﬂation
policy is credible, the cost of disinﬂation
can be signiﬁcantly reduced and perhaps
eliminated.14 For such reasons, there is 
no consensus about the cost of disinﬂa t i o n .
Instead, I present estimates from a pro c e d u re
for estimating the cost of disinﬂation
frequently used by advocates of a policy 
of moderate inﬂation.15
The Cost of Reducing Inﬂation
I estimate the present value of 
the output loss that has accompanied
signiﬁcant periods of disinﬂation.  The
estimates are for the United States and 
are explicitly based on the work of Ball
(1994a) and Howitt (1990), but the
antecedent is Okun (1978). 
The ﬁrst step is to identify periods of
s i g n i ﬁcant disinﬂation.  Ball deﬁnes a period
of signiﬁcant disinﬂation as a period when
the long-run or trend inﬂation rate falls by
one percentage point or more.  The next
step is to measure the output loss.  Both
Ball and Howitt consider the output lost
during disinﬂa t i o n episodes to be the
difference between what output would
have been in the absence of the disinﬂa t i o n
and actual output.  The approaches differ
only in the way they calculate what output
would have been.
Ball does this by connecting output
when the trend inﬂation rate is at its peak
with output four quarters after the trend
inﬂation rate reaches its trough.  He does
this on the assumption that the effects of
disinﬂation on output continue for a 
while after disinﬂation ends.
Howitt uses the unemployment 
rate to gauge output loss.  For Howitt, 
the disinﬂation period ends when the
unemployment rate returns to the level 
it was when the disinﬂation episode 
began.  The output loss is calculated by
using Okun’s Law.  Howitt assumes that
each percentage point rise in the unemploy-
m e n t rate for a year costs society the
equivalent of 2 percent of real GDP.16
A signiﬁcant difﬁculty with this general
approach to measuring the output loss of
disinﬂationary policy is that all output
losses during these periods are attributed
to disinﬂation.  It is certainly possible—
indeed, many would claim likely—that
some part of the output decline is cyclical,
that is, the economy’s dynamic response 
to past shocks—monetary or real.
Perhaps more important, this
approach assumes that all disinﬂation 
is attributable to monetary policy actions
and not to the simultaneous occurrence 
of other shocks.  This is particularly
troubling since no attempt is made to
connect the disinﬂation experience dire c t l y
to policy actions.  Consequently, there is
no way to determine the extent to which
the output loss during these disinﬂation
experiences may be a result of other
factors.17 Because of these difﬁculties, it 
is safe to say that this approach overstates
the output loss associated with disinﬂation
to a greater or a lesser degree.18
The Beneﬁt of Lower Inﬂation
Estimating the beneﬁt of a lower
inﬂation rate is no easier than estimating
the cost of disinﬂation policy.  Part of the
difﬁculty stems from the fact that money
affects economic welfare in many and
complex ways.  No general model of the
welfare beneﬁt of money and, hence, no
model of the welfare cost of inﬂation, exists.
Rather, a large body of literature outlines
the potential beneﬁts of price stability.19
Nevertheless, an approach to
estimating the welfare cost of inﬂation,
suggested by Bailey (1956) and Friedman
(1969), is frequently used.  This method
assumes that the beneﬁt of money accrues
solely to those who hold it.  Consequently,
Bailey and Friedman assume there is no
external beneﬁt from money’s use.  Under
this assumption, the beneﬁts from holding
money can be represented by what econo-
mists refer to as consumer’s surplus or, more
esoterically, Harberger triangles.  The idea
is simply that money is barren in that it
pays no explicit interest, so the value of
m o n e y ’s services, that is, the welfare 
MA R C H/ A P R I L 1 9 9 6
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14See, for example, Taylor
(1981 and 1983).
15See, for example, Fischer
(1984) and Blinder (1989).
16Some estimates of Okun’s
coefﬁcient put real GDP at 
2.5 percent.  Based on a 
study by Fortin and Bernier
(1988), however, Howitt 
uses a lower ﬁgure (2 percent)
to take account for the effect
on leisure.
17For a more detailed discussion
of these and other problems
with Ball’s approach, see
Cecchetti (1994).
18A methodology that mitigates
against these problems is
vector autoregession (VAR).
Unfortunately VAR results are
very sensitive to the degree of
difference in the model’s speci-
ﬁcation (see Cecchetti, 1994,
for an illustration of this point)
and to the variables that are
included in the speciﬁcation,
including the variable used 
to identify monetary policy
shocks.  VARs are subject to
other criticisms as well (see, 
for example, Cecchetti, 1995,
and Zellner, 1992).
19See, for example, Aiyagari
(1990), Briault (1995), Lucas
(1994), Tatom (1976),
Garﬁnkel (1989), Fischer
(1981), and Howitt (1990).FE D E R A L R E S E RV E BA N K O F S T.  L O U I S
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b e n e ﬁt of money, is equal to the area under
the demand curve for real money.20 The
welf a re cost of inﬂation is the amount by
w h i c h this area shrinks when the inﬂation
rate, and hence, the nominal interest rate,
rises.  Such an approach has been used
often.21 Most estimates of the cost of inﬂa-
tion range from about 0.0001 to 0.0005 of 
GDP per percentage point reduction 
in the long-run inﬂation rate.
Lucas (1994) has recently presented
convincing evidence that welfare cost of
inﬂation estimates based on Bailey’s and
Friedman’s approach may be too low.
A rguing that the data are better re p re s e n t e d
by the double-log speciﬁcation of money
demand, rather than the semi-elasticity
speciﬁcation commonly used and ﬁrst sug-
gested by Cagan (1956), Lucas estimates
the annual welfare cost of inﬂation to be
much higher than previous studies.  He
estimates the beneﬁts from reducing 
inﬂation to be about 0.002 of GDP per 
percentage point reduction in the 
inﬂation rate.22
Lucas’s estimates understate the
welfare cost of inﬂation if there are social
b e n e ﬁts from money in addition to money’s
private beneﬁts.  This possibility has been
suggested by Brunner and Meltzer (1971)
and Laidler (1990).  Elsewhere I explicitly
identiﬁed the social beneﬁts from money’s
use.23 In addition, Briault (1995) and I
assert that if the social beneﬁts of money
are signiﬁcant, disruptions of the monetary
system because of inﬂation are potentially
much more serious and costly than suggested
by estimates based solely on money’s
private beneﬁts.  If social beneﬁts from
money exist, the usual estimates of the
cost of inﬂation understate the welfare 
cost of inﬂation.
Moreover, as Briault (1995) points 
out, arguments for why inﬂation and inﬂa-
tion uncertainty lead to a misallocation 
of resources suggest that inﬂation may 
not only affect the level of output, but may
affect the growth rate of output as well.
Indeed, there has been increasing intere s t —
both theoretical and empirical—in the
possibility that inﬂation reduces out-
put growth.
Comparing the Costs and Beneﬁts
The estimates of the cost of disinﬂa t i o n ,
PVL, and the beneﬁt, PVG, are for the three
d i s i n ﬂation episodes Ball (1994a) identiﬁe s .
They are 1969:4-1971:4, 1974:1-1976:4,
and 1980:1-1983:4.  The average rate of
output growth for the United States was
3.01 percent from 1960:1 to 1995:3.
Consequently, the estimates presented 
in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are based on the
assumption that the growth rate in the
“high” inﬂation state, a, is 3 percent (0.03).
The estimates of the effect of inﬂation on
the level of output as a proportion of cur-
rent period income per percentage point
reduction in the inﬂation rate, q, reﬂect
estimates obtained in the literature and
range from q = 0.0001 to 0.002.  The esti-
mates of PVG are calculated using the
f o rmula presented in Appendix A.  To make
the estimated cost and beneﬁt as comparable
as possible, PVG is based on the length 
of each disinﬂation episode and the corre-
sponding reduction in the inﬂation rate
identiﬁed by Ball (1994a).
A comparison of PVL and PVG in
Table 2 shows that PVL > PVG only if the
effect of inﬂation on the level of output is
assumed to be relatively small and the dis-
count rate is taken to be relatively large.
Indeed, the importance of the discount
rate in deciding that moderate inﬂation is
optimal is apparent.  Table 2 assumes there
is no growth rate effect, µ = a.  When the
discount rate is only slightly larger than
the growth rate of output, PVG exceeds
PVL even for an extremely small effect of
inﬂation on output.  For example, if the
discount rate is assumed to be about half 
a perc e n t a g e point larger than the gro w t h
rate of output, PVG > PVL for each of 
the disinﬂation episodes that Ball has
identiﬁed, even if the percentage point
reduction in the level of output is only
0.0001.  When the likelihood that estimates
of PVL overstate the w e l f a re cost and
estimates of PVG u n d e r s t a t e the welfare
beneﬁts of disinﬂation policy a re taken 
into consideration, these estimates suggest
that a policy of moderate inﬂation is
optimal only if the effects of inﬂation on
20Failure to understand the
nature of the welfare costs 
of inﬂation has led Aiyagari
(1990) to suggest that they
could be reduced simply by
allowing “more forms of
money that are used in transac-
tions to earn market rates of
interest.”  This recommenda-
tion fails to recognize that an
asset which provides multiple
services has a return that
reﬂects the marginal value of
each of the services rendered.
This insight is the basis for the
Divisia monetary aggregates, 
or monetary services indexes,
pioneered by Barnett (1980).
Inﬂation would cause the rates
on assets that provided rela-
tively more monetary services
to rise less than those which
provide fewer monetary
services.  As a result, inﬂation
would continue to induce indi-
viduals to reduce their use of
monetary services. 
21See, for example, Cooley 
and Hansen (1989), Fischer
(1981), and Lucas (1981 
and 1994).
22Lucas (1994) estimates that at
a 10 percent nominal interest
rate, the output loss per annum
is equal to 1.3 percent of
current output.  Assuming the
real interest rate is 3 percent, 
a nominal interest rate of 
10 percent is equivalent to a
steady-state inﬂation rate of 
7 percent.  The proportionate
decline in output per percent-
age point drop in the inﬂation
rate is therefore equal to
0.0018 [0.0130/7] 
» 0.002.
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output are extremely small or the discount
rate is large.
Estimates based on Howitt’s procedure
are reported in Table 3.  These estimates
are only presented for the third disinﬂation
episode.  The reason is that Howitt’s proce-
dure requires the unemployment rate to
return to the level at the beginning of the
disinﬂation episode.  The unemployment
rate was 3.6 percent in 1969:4 and 5.1 per-
cent in 1974:1.  The unemployment rate
has yet to return to either of these levels,
so by Howitt’s criterion, these disinﬂation
episodes have yet to end.  Of course, the
problem is that the unemployment rate is
affected by factors other than disinﬂation.
The secular effects on the unemployment
rate clearly have been dominant.  Because
of this, the unemployment rate has yet to
return to levels reached in the late 1960s.
This fact serves to underscore a problem
with both Howitt’s and Ball’s procedures.
Namely, the methods assume that all the
decline in employment and output is
because of disinﬂation and not because 
of other factors.
A comparison of PVL and PVG in
Table 3 yields conclusions similar to those
reached in Table 2.  The PVLs in Table 3
are considerably larger than those of the
corresponding disinﬂation in Table 2
primarily because the length of the disinﬂa-
t i o n episode was much longer 7.25 years
(compared with 3.75 years in Table 2), and
output was assumed to be below its trend
level during the entire period.
M A R C H/ AP R I L 1 9 9 6
Costs and Beneﬁts of Disinﬂation: Ball’s Approach
PVL PVG1
1969:4- 1974:1- 1980:1- 1969:4- 1974:1- 1980:1-
1971:4 1976:4 1983:4 1971:4 1976:4 1983:4
0.0001 0.0305 0.0118 0.0477 0.0973 0.4276 0.7989 1.7627
0.0001 0.0350 0.0118 0.0474 0.0964 0.0424 0.0789 0.1733
0.0001 0.0400 0.0117 0.0471 0.0955 0.0210 0.0389 0.0851
0.0001 0.0450 0.0117 0.0469 0.0945 0.0138 0.0256 0.0556
0.0002 0.0305 0.0118 0.0478 0.0973 0.8551 1.5978 3.5254
0.0002 0.0350 0.0118 0.0474 0.0964 0.0847 0.1578 0.3466
0.0002 0.0400 0.0117 0.0471 0.0955 0.0420 0.0778 0.1701
0.0002 0.0450 0.0117 0.0469 0.0945 0.0277 0.0512 0.1113
0.0010 0.0305 0.0118 0.0478 0.0973 4.2757 7.9890 17.6269
0.0010 0.0350 0.0118 0.0474 0.0964 0.4237 0.7891 1.7332
0.0010 0.0400 0.0117 0.0471 0.0955 0.2098 0.3891 0.8505
0.0010 0.0450 0.0117 0.0469 0.0945 0.1385 0.2559 0.5565
0.0020 0.0305 0.0118 0.0478 0.0973 8.5514 15.9780 35.2538
0.0020 0.0350 0.0118 0.0474 0.0964 0.8475 1.5782 3.4664
0.0020 0.0400 0.0117 0.0471 0.0955 0.4195 0.7783 1.7010
0.0020 0.0450 0.0117 0.0469 0.0945 0.2769 0.5118 1.1129
1The estimates are based on the duration of the disinﬂation episode and the reduction in the inﬂation rates for each episode as reported by Ball
(1994a).  The length of the disinﬂation episode, (that is, t1–t0, are 2.00, 2.75, and 3.75, respectively).  The decline in the inﬂation rates are
2.14, 4.00, and 8.83 percent, respectively.
q b
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If Inﬂation Affects Output Growth
The conclusion reached by applying
Howitt’s Rule changes dramatically if
inﬂation affects the growth rate of output.
Estimates of PVG under the assumption
that inﬂation reduces the growth rate of
output are presented in Table 4.  Since the
discount rate, b, must be larger than the
low-inﬂation output growth rate, µ, the
range of values considered for b is smaller
than that considered in Tables 2 and 3.
Also, since estimates of PVG are not
greatly affected by changes in the length 
of the disinﬂation episode, the values
reported are for a disinﬂation episode 
of 3.75 years.
These estimates show that the gain
from reducing inﬂation is very large, even
if inﬂation reduces output growth by as
little as one-thousandth of 1 percent
(0.00001).  Other things being equal,
Howitt’s Rule moves decidedly in the
direction of choosing a lower inﬂation
target if inﬂation affects the growth 
rate of output.
The level and growth rate effects are
additive.  Hence, if inﬂation reduces both
the level and growth rate of output, even
by relatively small amounts, the PVG from
reducing inﬂation could be very large,
depending on the discount rate used.  
For example, assume that the inﬂation 
rate is cut from its current rate of about 
3 percent to zero and this action raises the
level of output by 0.0003 (a 0.0001 per
percentage point drop in the inﬂation rate)
and increases output growth by 0.00001.
Assuming disinﬂation takes 3.75 years 
to be achieved and that the discount rate 
is a fairly large 4 percent, the PVG from
achieving price stability would equal 0.125
(the sum of a level effect of 0.0289 and a
growth rate effect of 0.0963).  If we use 
the estimates of PVL per percentage point
reduction in inﬂation using Howitt’s
method from Table 3, the PVL would 
only be 0.0772.  The difference is 0.0478.
Annualized output in the second quarter
of 1995 was approximately $5.5 trillion.
Consequently, the net present value of 
the gain from reducing inﬂation from its
Table 3
Costs and Beneﬁts of Inﬂation: 
H o w i t t ’s Approach
1
q b PVL2 PVG3
0.0001 0.0305 0.2341 1.7596
0.0001 0.0350 0.2309 0.1703
0.0001 0.0400 0.2273 0.0821
0.0001 0.0450 0.2238 0.0528
0.0002 0.0305 0.2341 3.5192
0.0002 0.0350 0.2309 0.3406
0.0002 0.0400 0.2273 0.1642
0.0002 0.0450 0.2238 0.1056
0.0010 0.0305 0.2341 17.5961
0.0010 0.0350 0.2309 1.7031
0.0010 0.0400 0.2273 0.8212
0.0010 0.0450 0.2238 0.5280
0.0020 0.0305 0.2341 35.1922
0.0020 0.0350 0.2309 3.4063
0.0020 0.0400 0.2273 1.6425
0.0020 0.0450 0.2238 1.0560
1 The disinﬂation period is 1980:1–1987:2.
2 The PVL does not change with q.
3 The length of the disinﬂation episode was 7.25; however, the decline in the steady-state
inﬂation rate was 8.83 percent (as assumed by Ball, 1994a).
Table 4
P V G When Inﬂation Affects Output Growth










1 These estimates are based on the assumption that a = 0.03 and t1–t0= 3.75.FE D E R A L R E S E RV E B A N K O F S T. L O U I S
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current level of about 3 percent to zero




The above analysis shows that an
important factor in determining whether
the beneﬁt of price stability exceeds the
cost is whether inﬂation affects output
growth.  If it does, it is very difﬁcult 
to argue that a policy of maintaining
moderate inﬂation is socially optimal 
by appealing to Howitt’s Rule.  Hence, 
it is not surprising that a relatively large
effort has been devoted to this question.24
Although there is evidence that inﬂa-
tion reduces output growth, it appears to
be the case only at relatively high inﬂation
rates.  It is becoming increasingly clear
that the effect of inﬂation on growth is
statistically signiﬁcant only at relatively
high rates of inﬂation.25 For example,
Barro ﬁnds a statistically signiﬁcant effect
only when inﬂation is 15 percent or
higher.  Similarly,  Bruno and Easterly 
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂation
effect only when the inﬂation rate exceeds
40 percent for two or more years.26
The evidence is controversial; how-
ever, the important point is that this
evidence cannot support or reject the idea
that moderate inﬂation affects the growth
rate of output.  The reasons are twofold. 
First, the data contain relatively few
observations where the inﬂation rate is 
in the low to moderate range and even
fewer observations where inﬂation is zero.
Extrapolating statistical results outside the
region for which the data are relevant is
risky.  Consequently, using the results of
such data to infer the effect of moderate
inﬂation on growth is tenuous at best.
This is especially true if the effect of inﬂa-
tion on growth is believed to be nonlinear,
that is, the effect of inﬂation on growth 
is disproportionately larger or smaller 
at lower rates of inﬂation.
It is commonly believed that the
effects of inﬂation will be proportionately
smaller at lower rates of inﬂation than at
higher rates.27 Recently, however, Lucas
(1994) presented evidence that the effect
of inﬂation on output is proportionately
larger at lower rates of inﬂation.  It is safe
to say that any statement about the exact
nature of the nonlinearity at low rates of
inﬂation is conjectural.  There is some evi-
dence, however, that the effects at high
rates of inﬂation are bounded.  That is,
beyond some point, higher inﬂation rates
have no further effect on either the level or
growth rate of output.  If the effects are
bounded at high inﬂation rates and one
believes that the effects of inﬂation are
proportionately smaller at lower inﬂation
rates, then there must be an inﬂection
point—the effects of inﬂation ﬁrst increase
at an increasing rate and then increase at a
decreasing rate.
Second, because an economically rele-
vant growth rate effect can be very small, 
it may be difﬁcult to ﬁnd an economically
relevant growth rate effect that is also
statistically signiﬁcant.  For example,
Barro (1995) investigated the nonlinearity
of the inﬂation effect by partitioning the
median inﬂation rates into those up to 
15 percent, 15 percent to 40 percent, and
above 40 percent.  His estimates of the
effect of inﬂation on growth for the three
partitions were –0.00016, –0.00037, and
–0.00023, respectively.  Only the last two
coefﬁcients were signiﬁcantly different
from zero.  My previous analysis showed
that the estimate for the ﬁrst partition
(–0.00016) is large enough to be economi-
cally relevant.  Its absolute value, however,
is less than one-half its estimated standard
error of 0.00035.  Given the amount of
variability in data like these, it may be 
very difﬁcult to obtain an economically
relevant, statistically signiﬁcant estimate 
of inﬂation’s effect on output growth.
Time-Series Evidence
Recently, Ericsson, Irons, and Tryon
(1993) criticized cross-sectional studies of
the effects of inﬂation on growth, arguing
that the results are very sensitive to a few
very high inﬂation countries and that
time-averaged data can give misleading
24See, for example, Wallich
(1969); Barro (1995 and
forthcoming); Bruno (1995);
Jones and Manuelli (1995);
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
(1992); Logue and Sweeney
(1981); Kormendi and
Meguire (1985); Grier and
Tullock (1989); Bruno and
Easterly (forthcoming); Levine
and Renelt (1992); Levine,
Renelt, and Zervos (1993);
and Fischer (1993).  All these
empirical studies use cross-
sectional or panel data.
25See Bruno and Easterly (forth-
coming) and Barro (1995 
and forthcoming).
26Although these results are
broadly consistent with those 
of Levine and Renelt (1992);
Levine, Renelt, and Zervos
(1993); and Fischer (1993),
who showed that the effect of
inﬂation on growth is due to
the presence of a few high
inﬂation countries, Barro and
Bruno and Easterly present
evidence that their results are
not sensitive to a few high
inﬂation countries.
27See, for example, Howitt
(1990) and DeLong and
Summers (1992).results about the causal relationship
between inﬂation and output growth.
Instead they use time-series data for the
United States for the period 1953-90.
Using a statistical procedure called 
co-integration analysis, Ericsson, Irons, 
and Tryon ﬁnd evidence that inﬂation 
does not affect the long-run rate of output
growth.28 Instead, they ﬁnd that the level
of output is positively related to the long-
run inﬂation rate.  Their result is circ u m-
spect, however.  Taken literally, it implies
that not only is a little inﬂation good for
the economy, but that a lot of inﬂation 
is even better.
More important, their ﬁnding depends
critically on their assumption about the
time-series properties of the price level.  
It can be shown that different assumptions
about the time-series properties of the
price level yield considerably different
results.  Appendix B gives the details.  In
particular, it can be shown that long-run
inﬂation and output growth are negatively
related.  The estimated long-run relation-
ship between per capita output and the
price level is:
(1) Xt = –0.0695Pt + 0.0217T,
where X is the natural log of real per capita
output, P is the natural log of the implicit
price deﬂator, and T is a deterministic time
trend.  Equation 1 suggests that the long-
run growth rate of output is equal to
0.0217 less 0.0695 times the inﬂation rate.
The inﬂation rate over this period was 
4.37 percent.  Using this ﬁgure, per capita
output growth is estimated to be 1.87 per-
cent, somewhat larger than the actual
growth rate of per capita output of 
1.68 percent over this period.
This analysis is very simple, including
only output and the price level.  Moreover,
co-integration analysis cannot indicate
whether the negative long-run relationship
between the price level and output is a
result of the effects of inﬂation on output
growth, the effect of output growth on
inﬂation, or the effect of some other
variable(s) on both output and prices.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that 
a very reasonable change in the speciﬁca-
tion of Ericsson, Irons, and Tryon’s model
dramatically alters their result.  The data
suggest that, for the United States (over
this period), inﬂation could have had 
a detrimental effect on output growth.
Hence, the time-series evidence is at least
consistent with the proposition that inﬂa-
tion reduces the growth rate of output.
IS PRICE STABILITY 
THE BEST POLICY?
Most policymakers and economists
agree that very high rates of inﬂation 
are detrimental.  So much so, that there 
is broad agreement that the gain from
reducing inﬂation from “high” levels to
“moderate” levels warrants the temporary
loss of employment and output that many
believe is necessary to achieve this goal.
Despite the fact that most economists
believe inﬂation is detrimental to economic
welfare, many believe that, once under
way, it is better to live with some moderate
inﬂation than to bear the costs necessary
to achieve stable prices.  Peter Howitt
(1990) succinctly states the proposition
that the cost of going from moderate to
zero inﬂation does not warrant the beneﬁts
from price stability.  Howitt’s Rule states
that a policy of disinﬂation should be con-
tinued until an inﬂation rate is reached
where the present value of the costs of 
further disinﬂation are just equal to the
present value of the gains from a further
reduction in the inﬂation rate.
Does economic analysis support 
or refute the idea that it is desirable to
establish a policy of price stability?  Unfor-
tunately, there is no deﬁnitive answer to
this question.  The analysis presented here,
however, suggests that a popular and (for
many) a compelling economic argument
for a policy of positive inﬂation requires
several controversial conditions.  If one
believes that the welfare gains of future
generations should not be discounted or
that the discount rate is low, it is difﬁcult
to argue for a policy of moderate inﬂation. 
Moreover, this argument is weakened
signiﬁcantly if inﬂation reduces the growth
28See Dickey, Jansen, and
Thornton (1991) for a
discussion of co-integration 
and unit roots.
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33rate and not simply the level of output.
The economic case for a policy of price
stability based on the effects of inﬂation on
output growth may come down to whether
one ﬁnds compelling various theoretical
arguments of why even moderate inﬂation
should affect output growth.29 If you
believe it is likely that inﬂation reduces 
the growth rate of output, you are much
more likely to believe that price stability 
is the best monetary policy.
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35Let the level of steady-state output at
each point in time at the current “high”
inﬂation rate be given by:
(A1) yt = eat,
where a is the growth rate of real output
given the high inﬂation state.
When calculating the effect of a
permanent reduction in the inﬂation rate,
assume the monetary authority imple-
ments the deﬂationary policy at time t0,
when the level of output is y0, and that 
the new lower inﬂation policy is achieved
at time t1.  We consider the possibility 
that reduced inﬂation raises the level 
of output and the possibility that it
permanently raises the growth rate of
output, once the new lower inﬂation 
rate is achieved.  For the level effect,
output is unchanged until time t1 but 
is higher by an amount d for all t > t1.  
It is convenient to express d as a pro-
portion of output at the time that the
disinﬂation policy is implemented, that 
is, d = qy0.  For the growth rate effect,
output is assumed to grow at the rate a
until time t1 and at the rate µ for all t > t1,
where µ > a. Under these assumptions, 
the low-inﬂation output path is given by:
( A 2 )
If output is discounted at the rate 
b > µ for all t greater than t0, the difference
between low- and high-inﬂation output,
yields the present value of the gain,
(A3)
Dividing through by y0 and performing the
integration, yields:
(A4)
Because we have no interest in the case
where the time horizon is ﬁnite, take the
limit of the above expression as T goes to
inﬁnity.  This yields:
(A5)
The ﬁrst term on the right side of
equation A5 is the effect of a change in the
growth rate.  Hence, it is zero if µ = a (that
is, there is no growth-rate effect).  The
second term on the right side is the effect
of a shift in the level of output.  This term
is zero only if q = 0.  The ﬁrst term is an
increasing function of µ – a and µ – b
(recall that µ – b is strictly negative under
the assumptions stated) and a decreasing
function of t1.  The second term is an
increasing function of q and µ – b and a
decreasing function of t1.  The importance
of the size of the discount rate relative to
the growth rate of output is clear from this
expression.  Both terms on the right side of
equation A5 approach +¥ as b approaches
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Ericsson, Irons, and Tryon (1993)
recently criticized cross-sectional studies
of inﬂation’s effects on growth.  They argue
that the results are very sensitive to a few
very high inﬂation countries and argue
that time-averaged data can give misleading
results about the causal relationship between
inﬂation and output growth.  Moreover,
using tests for unit roots and co-integration,
they ﬁnd evidence that generally does not
support the theory that inﬂation has an
effect on growth.  Indeed, their results for
the United States suggest that, in the long
run, inﬂation raises the level of output
without affecting the growth rate of
output.  Taken literally, Ericsson, Irons,
and Tryon’s results suggest that not only 
is a little inﬂation good for the economy,
but that a lot of inﬂation is even better.
TESTS FOR A UNIT ROOT
Their analysis, however, depends
critically on tests for a unit root,
supporting the notion that the real per
capita output, X, is integrated of order 
1, I(1), while the price level, P , is I(2).
These tests have difﬁculty rejecting the
null hypothesis of a unit root when the
estimated root is close to, but perhaps
different from, unity, as illustrated in 
Table B1.  It shows the results from
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of a
unit root for X, DX, P , and DP and the cor-
responding estimates of the root, l, using
annual data for the period 1953-90.  As
did Ericsson, Irons, and Tryon, I included
a constant and a deterministic time trend
in each case and used ADF tests with two
lags.
The null hypothesis of a unit root is
not rejected even when the estimated root
is quite different from zero, as shown in
Table B1.  This is true for X and DP , where
the estimated roots are 0.7006 and 0.8262,
respectively.  This is because of the well-
known fact that such tests lack the ability
to reject the null hypothesis when it is false.1
NONSTATIONARY
VARIABLES
How this problem affects the determi-
nation of whether X or DP is nonstationary
is illustrated in Figure B1, which shows X
and DP over the sample period.  The ADF
test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root for both X and DP.  In the case 
of X, Figure B1 makes it clear that this
variable is nonstationary in the sense that
it rises fairly steadily.  Hence, both the test
and an inspection of the data suggest that
the series is nonstationary.2
From a visual inspection of DP, it 
is much less clear that the inﬂation rate 
is nonstationary in the sense that it will
wander off indeﬁnitely.  The problem is
Appendix B
TIME-SERIES EVIDENCE ON INFLATION’S EFFECTS 
ON GROWTH
1 This is referred to as the power
of the test.  Hence, the Dickey-
Fuller test is said to lack power.
2 Some care must be exercised
here, however, because the
data could be stationary around
a deterministic time trend.
Because our test included a
constant and a trend variable,
we are more inclined to accept
the test results in this case.
Table B1
Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller, 
Unit Root Te s t s
Critical Value,
Variable Estimate Root ADFt-Statistic 5% Level




1 Indicates the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
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           that there is a lot of persistence in 
the inﬂation rate.  When the inﬂation 
rate increases, it continues to increase 
for a period before it begins to fall.  
When falling, it continues to fall for 
a period before it begins to rise.  It 
is this persistence in the inﬂation 
rate that accounts for the large 
estimated root.  Consequently, the 
test results that suggest that DP is




Given the uncertainty of the order 
of integration of P , it is important to
investigate whether Ericsson, Irons, 
and Tryon’s results are sensitive to their
claim that P is I(2).  To investigate this, 
I performed their co-integration analysis
with their speciﬁcations and using both 
X and DP and X and P.
The method of testing for co-integration
is that of Johansen (1988).  This approach
starts from a very general vector auto-
regression representation of the form
(B1) Yt = b(L)Yt–1 + et,
where Y is a two-by-one vector, b(L) is a
polynomial in the lag operator, L, that is,
b(L) = b0 + b1 L + b2L2 + . . . + bk Lk and
Lzt = zt– 1.  Equation B1 can be rewritten as,
(B2) DYt = G(L)DYt–1 + PYt–k + et.
If the elements of the Y vector, y1 and
y2, are I(1), they are co-integrated, that is,
there exists a linear combination of y1 and
y2 that is I(0), if the rank of the two-by-
two matrix P is 1.4 The Johansen test for
co-integration is a test of the rank of P.
Given the uncertainty about whether 
P is I(1) or I(2), tests for co-integration
were performed for two speciﬁcations 
of Y¢, namely, Y¢ = (X DP) and Y¢ = (X P).  
In both cases, a constant term and a
deterministic time trend were included
and k was set at 2.  The results are sum-
marized in Table B2.  Regardless of the
speciﬁcation of Y, there is evidence of 
a single co-integrating vector.5
In the case where Y¢= (X DP), the
estimated normalized co-integrating 
vector was X = 1.0581DP + 0.0179T, 
where T denotes the deterministic time
trend.  This estimate is very close to 
that reported by Ericsson, Irons, and
Tryon.  They interpret the estimated 
co-integrating vector as the long-run
relationship between output and inﬂation.
The implication of this co-integrating
vector—that output could be increased
simply by increasing the inﬂation rate—
is preposterous.
In contrast, the estimate of the 
co-integrating vector when Y¢ = (X P) is 
X = –0.0695P + 0.0217T.  This estimate
suggests that the level of output falls as 
the price level rises.  Because of constant
coefﬁcients and the log-linear speciﬁca-
tion, this result implies that the rate of
output growth falls as the inﬂation rate
rises.  The estimate suggests that a reduc-
tion of the inﬂation rate from 3 percent to
zero would increase the per capita output
growth rate by 0.00209, an amount that,
though small, is economically signiﬁcant.
3 The same conclusion applies to
accepting the hypothesis that 
X is nonstationary as opposed
to having a deterministic trend.
The null hypothesis of a unit
root is rejected because there 
is considerable persistence in
the swings of X about its trend
rather than getting farther and
farther from its estimated
trend.  Plotting X about its
trend over this period makes
this point clear.
4 Note that the rank of P could
only be two if the elements of
Y are I(0).  If the rank of Pis
zero, there would be no linear
combination of the elements 
of Y that is stationary [that is,
I(0)].  See Dickey, Jansen, and
Thornton (1991) for a more
detailed discussion of co-inte-
gration and the Johansen and
other tests for co-integration.
5 The level speciﬁcation [Y¢= 
(X P)] is preferable on theo-
retical grounds because
economic theory suggests that
there should be a contempora-
neous relationship between 
Xand P, that is, output and 
the price level are determined
simultaneously.  Indeed, equa-
tion B1 can be viewed as the
reduced form of a structural
model of the form, AYt =
B(L)Yt –1+ vt, so that, b(L) =
A –1B(L) and et = A –1vt. The
problem is that it is difﬁcult to
obtain estimates of the struc-
tural parameters in A without
imposing some rather severe
restrictions.  See Keating
(1992) for a discussion 
of these restrictions.
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Estimate Eigenvalues and Co-Integrating Vectors 
for Two Speciﬁcations of Equation B2
Eigenvalue X DP Trend Eigenvalue X P Trend
0.4399 –1.0000 1.0581 0.0179 0.4502 –1.0000 –0.0695 0.0217
0.0900 –0.3757 –1.0000 0.0075 0.1851 –0.2424 –1.0000 0.0615
Table B2